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The writer only suggests that to impose first degree murder auto-
matically without inquiry into whether the actor had the requisite
culpability with respect to the result threatens the very foundation
of the criminal law-the principal of punishing according to cul-
pability. If the Code with its firm foundation has not been accepted,
the law enforcement officials must analyze each fact situation and if
necessary, as in the principal case, punish only the justifiable crimes
-armed robbery and manslaughter. The system should not be




In Wofford v. Highway Comm'n, 1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court abolished the doctrine of eminent domain known as the
cul-de-sac principle.2 If a public authority blocks or vacates a por-
tion of a road, leaving any owner whose land abuts the remaining
road without access from one direction, the situation is generally
called a cul-de-sac. In the 1931 decision of Hiatt v. City of Greens-
boro,8 the court held that the creation of a cul-de-sac was compens-
able under eminent domain. 4 The rationale of the court was that
the owner whose property abuts a road has a private easement to
have the street remain open in both directions, and that the damage
to abutting owners was different in kind as well as in degree from
that of the general public. The court stated that the majority of
courts agreed with this view.
Since Hiatt the court has gradually restricted the application of
1263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965).
2 Cul-de-sac is French for "the bottom of a bag." The North Carolina
Supreme Court has defined the cul-de-sac principle as:
The rule that an abutting owner has a right of access to the
general system of streets and to the remainder of his street with all
of its connections to a point where they cease to be of more than
remote advantage to him, and that when one end of the street is closed
he is entitled .to- compensation...... -
Snow v. Highway Comm'n, 262 N.C. 169, 172, 136 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1964).
8201 N.C. 515, 160 S.E. 748 (1931).
'North Carolina has no eminent domain provision in its constitution.
However, just compensation for the taking of private property for public
use has been considered necessary under art. I, § 17 of the North Carolina
Constitution. Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C.




this doctrine. In Sanders v. Town of Smithfield5 the court refused
to allow compensation when the road was obstructed in a block
other than the one on which plaintiff's land was situated. Hiatt
was distinguished on the grounds that a cul-de-sac is not created
when there is an intersecting street between plaintiff's property and
the obstruction. This distinction seems to be generally recognized
by courts which hold cul-de-sac to be recoverable.6
In Snow v. Highway Comm'ne 7 the court refused to apply the
cul-de-sac principle in a rural situation. It made no justifiable dis-
tinction between the application of cul-de-sac in urban and rural
situations. The real reason for making such a distinction apparently
was that the court did not wish to overrule Hiatt without warning.
The distinction made will not bear analysis, but the case did serve
to give warning that the end of cul-de-sac was near in North Caro-
lina. This was particularly emphasized by the last sentence of the
case: "Quaere: If the questions presented by Hiatt arise again in
this jurisdiction, should this court re-examine its holding in that
case in the light of modem conditions and the trend of recent
opinion in other States ?,,'
Within a year the Wofford case overruled the Hiatt decision.
The first principle asserted by the court by Hiatt-that the
owner had a private easement of travel in both directions-had
been considerably weakened by well-settled rules that there is no
compensation when a municipality converts a street to a one-way
street9 or places permanent divider strips between the traffic lanes.'
With all the degrees of interference that are said to be reasonable
under the police power, it is doubtful if the abutting owner has any
right to a flow of traffic by his property."' Because of this, the
-221 N.C. 166, 171, 19 S.E.2d 630, 634 (1942).'E.g., In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925); Annot., 49
A.L.R. 361 (1927), 93 A.L.R. 642, 644 (1934).
1262 N.C. 169, 136 S.E.2d 678 (1964).
8Id. at 177, 136 S.E.2d at 684.
9E.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d 814,
180 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1958); City of Memphis v. Hood, 208 Tenn. 319, 345
S.W.2d 887 (1961) ; Walker v. State, 48 Wash. 2d 587, 295 P.2d 328 (1956).
1 E.g., Daugherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, 97 S.E.2d 300
(1957); Turner v. Roads Comm'n, 213 Md. 428, 132 A.2d 455 (1957);
Walker v. State, supra note 9.
" See Barnes v. Highway Comm'n, 257 N.C. 507, 126 S.E.2d 732 (1962).
It seems odd that courts holding cul-de-sac compensable would take this
position since the real damage is suffered from the loss of traffic by the
property, not from the landowner's own inability to travel in either direc-
tion.
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court decided that any damage done to an abutting owner's prop-
erty by being placed in a cul-de-sac was different only in degree
from that of the general public and not in kind. Therefore, the
damage was not compensable. The fact that the owner can now
travel only in one direction, necessitating a more circuitous route to
go in the other, is damnum absque injuria.
The above is a synopsis of the court's reasoning. However,
two reasons that were probably the real basis for the change in the
North Carolina view were unmentioned by the court: (1) the im-
practical consequences of the Hiatt rule under modern conditions,
and (2) a shift of the weight of authority on the question. It is
apparent that the theory of building roads and highways is quite
different today from what it was at the time of the Hiatt decision.
Limited access highways for rapid transit in rural and in urban
areas have become a necessity, and their costs are extremely high.
A recovery for the creation of a cul-de-sac would add considerably
to the costs. The Kansas Supreme Court, which has held cul-de-sac
to be compensable, recently recognized in dictum that "this new con-
cept [controlled access highways], which was not fully recognized
in our previous decisions, requires a complete review and reappraisal
of the correlative rights of ... owners of abutting lands"'12 and "a
present statement of public and private highway rights must reflect
prevailing conditions."' 3
In Hiatt, the court cited American Law Reports annotations
to show that its decision was consistent with the weight of author-
ity.' 4 This majority has clearly shifted.' Of the latest decisions
that could be found in the United States, twenty-three courts do
not allow recovery in the cul-de-sac situation,' and fourteen
12 Brock v. Highway Comm'n, - Kan. , , 404 P.2d 934, 939
(1965).'2 Id. at - , 404 P.2d at 942.
14 See Annot. 49 A.L.R. 361 (1927), 93 A.L.R. 642 (1934).
' 5 Justice Parker, dissenting in Wofford, disagrees. 263 N.C. at 685,
140 S.E.2d at 386.
"Ralph v. Hazen, 93 F.2d 68 (1937) ; Jackson v. Birmingham Foundary
& Mach. Co., 154 Ala. 464, 45 So. 660 (1908); Gayton v. Dep't. of High-
ways, 149 Colo. 899, 367 P.2d 899 (1962); Micone v. City of Middletown,
110 Conn. 664, 149 Atl. 408 (1930); Tift County v. Smith, 219 Ga. 68, 131
S.E.2d 527 (1963); Warren v. Highway Comm'n, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d
60 (1958); Dep't of Highways v. Jackson, 302 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1957);
La Croix v. Commonwealth, - Mass. - , 205 N.E.2d 228 (1965);
Krebs v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584, 154 Ati. 131 (1931); Phelps v. Stott Realty
Co., 233 Mich. 486, 207 N.W. 2 (1926); Handlan-Buck Co. v. Highway
Commn'n, 315 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1958); State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288
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do.' It is unclear in two jurisdictions previously permitting recovery
whether such is still the law."s Of the courts that have decided or
reaffirmed their positions since 1955, eleven have said there is to be
no recovery"0 while only six have held that the owner can recover.20
Therefore, it would seem that the weight of authority has shifted
and that the cul-de-sac principle is disappearing.
The courts holding that one may recover for his property's being
Pac. 181 (1930) (limited to rural roads); Fougeron v. County of Seward,
174 Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298 (1963); Cram v. City of Laconia, 71 N.H.
41, 51 Atl. 635 (1901); Mayor v. Hatt, 79 N.J.L. 548, 77 At. 47 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1910) (damages not allowed in the absence of statute); State ex
rel. Highway Comm'n v. Silva, 71 N.M. 350, 378 P.2d 595 (1962); Reis
v. City of New York, 188 N.Y. 58, 80 N.E. 573 (1907) ; Wofford v. High-
way Comm'n, 263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965); Babin v. City of
Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953); Hyde v. Minnesota
D. & P. Ry., 29 S.D. 220, 136 N.W. 92 (1912); City of Lynchburg v.
Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S.E. 674 (1926); State ex rel. Woods v. Road
Comm'n, - W.Va. - , 136 S.E.2d 314 (1964) (dictum upholding pre-
vious case); Stefan Auto Body v. Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 124
N.W.2d 319 (1963). In addition intermediate courts of two states have
held that no damages were recoverable. Jarnagin v. Highway Comm'n, 5
So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1942); City of Waco v. DuPuy, 386 S.W.2d 192
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
"? Highway Comm'n v. Kesner, - Ark. - , 388 S.W.2d 905 (1965);
Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961); Gibbons v. Paducah &
I.R.R., 284 Ill. 559, 120 N.E. 500 (1918); Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind.
455, 114 N.E. 965 (1917); Lacascio v. Northern Pac. Ry., 185 Minn. 281,
240 N.W. 661 (1932) (dictum following the leading case in re Hull, 163
Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925)); Highway Comm'n v. Fleming, 248 Miss.
187, 157 So. 2d 792 (1963); Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, 316 P.2d
828 (Okla. 1957); Ail v. City of Portland, 136 Ore. 654, 299 Pac. 306
(1931); Hedrich v. City of Harrisburg, 278 Pa. 274, 122 Atl. 281 (1923);
Wolfe v. City of Providence, 77 R.I. 192, 74 A.2d 843 (1950); Sease v.
City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963); Sweetwater
Valley Memorial Park v. City of Sweetwater, 213 Tenn. 1, 372 S.W.2d
168 (1963) (dictum indicating the court would follow two earlier cases);
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952); Fry
v. O'Leary 141 Wash. 465, 252 Pac. 111 (1927).
"In Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943),
the court declared that an abutting landowner could recover for his prop-
erty's being placed in a cul-de-sac. However, in Breidert v. Southern Pac.
Co. 61 Cal. 2d 659, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d 719 (1964), the court
said a cul-de-sac alone would not give recovery unless there has been a
"substantial impairment" of plaintiff's access to the streets. What the court
considers a substantial impairment is not yet clear. In Bolmar v. Board
of Comm'rs, 114 Kan. 552, 220 Pac. 245 (1923), the court said there could
be recovery for cul-de-sac. But in Brock v. Highway Comm'n, - Kan.-,
404 P.2d 934 (1965), the court said it would have to re-examine its rules
in this area in the light of the modem controlled-access highway.
"' See cases from Colo., Ga., Iowa, Ky., Mass., Mo., Neb., N.M., N.C.,
W.Va., and Wis. cited in note 16 supra.
2" See cases from Ark., Idaho, Miss., Okla., S.C., and Tenn. cited in
note 17 supra.
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placed in a cul-de-sac generally base their decisions on reasoning
similar to that in the Hiatt case--i.e., that an abutting land owner
has an easement in travel on the streets and highways in both direc-
tions, and there is damage to him different in kind and in degree
from that suffered by the public generally." On the other hand,
courts holding that no recovery can be had reason much as the
court in Wofford that a person has no right to traffic in front of
his property, and that the damage to the abutting landowner is
different only in degree from damage to the general public. It is
suggested that none of these reasons is the real basis for any of
the courts' decisions. The courts' decisions are in reality a result
of a balancing of interest of the landowner, who has unquestion-
ably been damaged, with that of society in having an efficient and
safe means of transportation at the lowest possible cost. If the
cases are viewed in this manner, the reason for the shift of the
weight of authority is obvious. With the costs of building high-
ways and other means of land transportation rising and with the
shift in highway building to the limited-access road, the balance
has swung to the side of the public interest.
DENNIS JAY WINNER
Investment Securities-Duty to Register Transfer
In Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc.,' the plaintiff, a New
York resident, was owner and holder of 10,920 shares of Class A
stock of defendant, United States Plastics, Inc. ("Plastics"), a
Florida corporation.2 Plaintiff acquired the shares while employed
by Plastics from one Scharps who, as president, "dominated and
controlled" Plastics.3 On termination of his employment, plaintiff
decided to sell the shares. The stock certificates carried a legend
"1 Textual writers generally favor giving compensation in this situation.
E.g., 4 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 358-59 (Moore, 2d ed.
1943).
1248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965).
'Plaintiff actually paid $27,500 for. 10,000 Class B convertible shares,
which he later converted on a share-for-share basis into an equal number
of Class A shares. In addition, 920 shares were received through stock
dividends in 1962 and 1964. Id. at 355.
'Id. at 363. Scharps was held not to be an indispensable party to this
suit, which concerns not Scharps' possible adverse claim to the shares, but
solely the question of the duty of Plastics and the transfer agent to register
transfer of the shares. Id. at 360.
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